Original issue date: August 14, 1990<BR>
Last revised: September 17, 1997<BR>
Attached copyright statement

<P>A complete revision history is at the end of this file.

Sun has recently released a patch for a security hole in SunView.
This problem affects SunView running on all versions of SunOS (3.5 and
before, 4.0, 4.0.1, 4.0.3, and 4.1) and all platforms (Sun3, Sun4,
386i).  This vulnerability allows any remote system to read selected
files from the workstation running SunView.  As noted below in the
IMPACT section, the files that can be read are limited.

<P>This vulnerability is in the SunView (aka SunTools) selection_svc
facility and can be exploited while SunView is in use; however, as
noted below in the IMPACT section, this bug may be exploitable after
the user quits using Sunview.  This problem cannot be exploited while
X11 is in use (unless the user runs X11 after running Sunview; see the
IMPACT section).  This problem is specific to Sun's SunView software;
to our knowledge, this problem does NOT affect other vendor platforms
or software.

<P>
<H2>Obtaining the Patch</H2>


To obtain the patch, please call your local Sun Answer Center
(in the USA, it's 1-800-USA-4SUN), and ask for patch number 100085-01.
You can also reference Sun Bug ID 1039576.

<P>The patch is available for SunOS 4.0.1, 4.0.3 and SunOS 4.1, on Sun3,
Sun4, and 386i architectures.  Contact Sun for further details.

<H2>Impact</H2>
On Sun3 and Sun4 systems, a remote system can read any file that is
readable to the user running SunView.  On the 386i, a remote system
can read any file on the workstation running SunView regardless of
protections.  Note that if root runs Sunview, all files are<BR>
potentially accessible by a remote system.

<P>If the password file with the encrypted passwords is world readable,
an intruder can take the password file and attempt to guess passwords.
In the CERT/CC's experience, most systems have at least one password
that can be guessed.

<P>Sunview does not kill the selection_svc process when the user quits
from Sunview.  Thus, unless the process is killed, remote systems can
still read files that were readable to the last user that ran Sunview.
Under these circumstances, once a user has run Sunview, start using
another window system (such as X11), or even logoff, but still have
files accessible to remote systems.  However, even though<BR>
selection_svc is not killed when Sunview exits, the patch still solves
the security problem and prevents remote access.

<P>CONTACT INFORMATION

<P>For further questions, please contact your Sun answer center or send
mail to <BR>
	<A HREF=mailto:security-features@sun.com>security-features@sun.com</A> 
.

<P><HR>

<P>Thanks to Peter Shipley for discovering, documenting, and helping
resolve this problem.

<P>
<!--#include virtual="/include/footer_nocopyright.html" -->
<P>Copyright 1990 Carnegie Mellon University.</P>

<HR>

Revision History
<PRE>
September 17,1997  Attached copyright statement
</PRE>