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How do we inform affected parties about vulnerabilities on large scale? Identifying contact points remains the main challenge that has to be addressed by the Internet society, including network providers, CERTs, and registrars. We imagine that this problem could, for example, be tackled by centralized contact databases, more efficient dissemination strategies within hosters/CERTs, or even a new notification channel or trusted party responsible for such notifications. Until we find solutions to the reachability problem, the effects of large-scale notifications are likely to remain low in the future.



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< 5.3 Two-Party CVD | 5.5 Response Pacing and Synchronization >


References

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