

CERT Advisory CA-1992-18 VMS Monitor Vulnerability

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CA-92:16 CERT Advisory
 September 22, 1992
 VMS Monitor Vulnerability

*** SUPERSEDED BY CA-92:18 ***

The CERT Coordination Center has received information concerning a potential vulnerability with Digital Equipment Corporation's VMS Monitor. This vulnerability is present in V5.0 through V5.4-2 but has been corrected in V5.4-3 through V5.5-1. The Software Security Response Team at Digital has provided the following information concerning this vulnerability.

NOTE: Digital suggests that customers who are unable to upgrade their systems implement the workaround described below.

For additional information, please contact your local Digital Equipment Corporation customer service representative.

Beginning of Text provided by Digital Equipment Corporation

SSRT-0200 PROBLEM: Potential Security Vulnerability Identified in Monitor
 SOURCE: Digital Equipment Corporation
 AUTHOR: Software Security Response Team - U.S.
 Colorado Springs USA

 PRODUCT: VMS
Symptoms Identified On: VMS, Versions 5.0, 5.0-1, 5.0-2, 5.1, 5.1-B,
 5.1-1, 5.1-2, 5.2, 5.2-1, 5.3,
 5.3-1, 5.3-2, 5.4, 5.4-1, 5.4-2

SOLUTION: This problem is not present in VMS V5.4-3
 (released in October 1991) through V5.5-1
 (released in July, 1992.)

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PROBLEM/IMPACT:

Unauthorized privileges may be expanded to authorized users of a system under certain conditions, via the Monitor utility. Should a system be compromised through unauthorized access, there is a risk of potential damage to a system environment. This problem will not permit unauthorized access entry, as individuals attempting to gain unauthorized access will continue to be denied through the standard VMS security mechanisms.

SOLUTION:

This potential vulnerability does not exist in VMS V5.4-3
(released in October 1991) and later versions of VMS through V5.5-1.

Digital strongly recommends that you upgrade to a minimum of VMS V5.4-3, and further, to the latest release of VMS V5.5-1. (released in July, 1992)

INFORMATION:

If you cannot upgrade at this time Digital recommends that you implement a workaround (examples attached below) to avoid any potential vulnerability.

As always, Digital recommends that you periodically review your system management and security procedures. Digital will continue to review and enhance the security features of its products and work with customers to maintain and improve the security and integrity of their systems.

WORKAROUND

A suggested workaround would be to remove the installed image SYS\$SHARE:SPISHR.EXE via VMS INSTALL and/or restrict the use of the MONITOR utility to "privileged" system administrators. Below are the examples of doing both;

[1] To disable the MONITOR utility the image SYS\$SHARE:SPISHR.EXE should be

deinstalled.

From a privileged account;

For cluster configurations;

```
$ MC SYSMAN
SYSMAN> SET ENVIRONMENT/CLUSTER
SYSMAN> DO INSTALL REMOVE SYS$SHARE:SPISHR.EXE
SYSMAN> DO RENAME SYS$SHARE:SPISHR.EXE SPISHR.HOLD
SYSMAN> EXIT
```

For non-VAXcluster configurations;

```
$INSTALL
INSTALL>REMOVE SYS$SHARE:SPISHR.EXE
INSTALL>EXIT
$RENAME SYS$SHARE:SPISHR.EXE SPISHR.HOLD
```

[2] If you wish to restrict access to the MONITOR command so that only a limited number of authorized (or privileged) persons are granted access to the utility, one method might be to issue the following example commands;

From a privileged account;

For cluster configurations;

```
$ MC SYSMAN
SYSMAN> SET ENVIRONMENT/CLUSTER
SYSMAN> DO INSTALL REMOVE SYS$SHARE:SPISHR.EXE
SYSMAN> DO SET FILE/ACL=(ID=*,ACCESS=NONE) SYS$SHARE:SPISHR.EXE
SYSMAN> DO SET FILE/ACL=(ID=SYSTEM,ACCESS=READ+EXECUTE) SYS$SHARE:SPISHR.EXE
SYSMAN> DO INSTALL ADD SYS$SHARE:SPISHR.EXE/OPEN/HEADER/SHARE/PROTECT
SYSMAN> EXIT
$
```

THIS WILL IMPACT the MONITOR UTILITY FOR REMOTE MONITORING.
LOCAL MONITORING WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR PERSONS HOLDING THE ID's GRANTED ACL ACCESS.

see additional note(s) below

For non-VAXcluster configurations;

```
$ INSTALL
INSTALL>REMOVE SYS$SHARE:SPISHR.EXE
INSTALL>EXIT
$ SET FILE /ACL=(ID=*,ACCESS=NONE) SYS$SHARE:SPISHR.EXE
$ SET FILE /ACL=(ID=SYSTEM,ACCESS=READ+EXECUTE) SYS$SHARE:SPISHR.EXE
$ INSTALL
INSTALL>ADD SYS$SHARE:SPISHR.EXE/OPEN/HEADER/SHARE/PROTECT
INSTALL>EXIT
$
```

IN THE ABOVE EXAMPLES, THE "SET FILE /ACL" LINE SHOULD BE REPEATED FOR ALL ACCOUNTS THAT ARE REQUIRED/ALLOWED TO USE THE DCL MONITOR COMMAND.

NOTE: The ID -SYSTEM- is an example, and should be substituted as necessary with valid user ID's that are associated with accounts you wish to grant access to.

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End of Text provided by Digital Equipment Corporation

CERT wishes to thank Teun Nijssen of CERT-NL (the SURFnet CERT, in the Netherlands) for bringing this security vulnerability to our attention. We would also like to thank Digital Equipment Corporation's Software Security Response Team for providing information on this vulnerability.

If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact CERT or your representative in FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams).

Internet E-mail: cert@cert.org
Telephone: 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
CERT personnel answer 7:30 a.m.-6:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4), on call for emergencies during other hours.

CERT Coordination Center
Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890

Past advisories, information about FIRST representatives, and other information related to computer security are available for anonymous ftp from cert.org (192.88.209.5).

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